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Social Security Taxation and Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Walter Enders and Harvey E. Lapan
The life cycle hypothesis has become the dominant mode used to analyze
the effects of a social security system on private saving, the labor/leisure
choice, and social welfare. As both Barro and Samuelson indicate, a fully
funded Social Security program (in a world of certainty) would drive out an
equivalent amount of private saving. If the interest rate is r, the effects
of a payment of a dollar into the social security pool while young would just
offset* the effects of receiving (1+r) dollars as a transfer when retired.
Papers by Diamond, Hi», and Samuelson, among others, have examined the effects
of non-fully funded Social Security schemes in a growing economy. A non-fully
funded program can be used to alter the private sector's saving rate and,
hence, the capital/labor ratio. Social Security, then, can be used as a
policy tool for achieving the (or some variant of the) golden rule growth
path. In this regard, an optimal Social Security scheme can be found which
will increase the long-run well-being of an economy. Authors such as Feldstein
and Hu have argued that Social Security can be expected to reduce the labor
supply if the time of retirement is endogenous. In essence, Social Security
acts as a tax on earnings for those remaining on the job after the normal re
tirement age.
While important, the results discussed above were derived from models '
which abstracted from uncertainty. It is the purpose of this paper to develop
® life cycle model which highlights the role of uncertainty. The model is
then used to re-examine the effects of Social Security on private saving, the
labor/leisure choice, and social welfare. It is shown that in an uncertain
world, a fully funded Social Security program will not, in general, drive out
an equivalent amount of private saving. Even if the program is actuarially
fair from an individual's point of view, a fully funded plan can be expected
to alter the supply of labor. Within the context of our model, it is shown
that—in the absence of uncertainty--private decisions are optimal; at best,
a Social Security plan will have no real effects. However, we shall show that
^ under uncertainty, private decisions will not, in general, be optimal even if
individuals have rational expectations. Consequently, some scope exists for
social policy to produce an improvement in social welfare, and it will be
demonstrated that a Social Security scheme exists that will produce an effi
cient allocation of resources. Perhaps our most interesting results concern
second best Social Security plans, i.e. those which distort labor decisions.
It is shown that distortionary plans exist that lead to an improvement in
social welfare.
At this point some caveats concerning the nature of our model are in
order. It is assumed that individuals live for two periods; choosing the
division of time between labor and leisure in the first, but retired in the
second. Thus, as opposed to Feldstein and Hu, we do not allow for work during
the second period of life. Individuals in their first period of life must
make the interrelated decisions of how much to work, consume and save for the
second period of life. We assume that population is constant, that output is
not storable and that labor is the only factor of production. Thus, money
is the only store of value, and we cannot analyze the effects of Social Security
taxes on growth paths k la Diamond, Hu, and Samuelson. Lastly, we do not con
sider the transition during which the Social Security program is being imple
mented. Readers interested in such issues should see Flemming. Yet, we do
not believe that these simplifications are overly severe for they serve to
highlight•the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty enters the model in the form
of a stochastic production function disturbance. Given this exogenous output
uncertainty, the overall price level and the value of ones savings for re
tirement are also uncertain. As stated above, in the absence of this output
uncertainty, there would be no scope for a Social Security plan in the context
of our model. Thus, all of our findings concerning the beneficial effects of
Social Security arise because Social Security acts to reduce the undesirable
effects of uncertainty. It should be stressed that the beneficial effects of
Social Security plans are not due to myopia on the part of the private sector or
to Ponzi/chain-letter effects. We assume that individuals have rational ex
pectations and our assumptions of a constant population and no physical capital
rule out chain-letter effects. Social Security programs act as a means to
pool risk across generations. While the price mechanism does, to some extent,
allow for intergenerational risk sharing, a Social Security plan can induce
the socially optimal degree of risk sharing. With social Security taxes being
proportional to income, social security is a means to transfer income from
high to low output generations. If risk averse individuals do not know whether
they will be members of a high or low output generation, they will, in general,
prefer some form of intergenerational risk sharing.
The first section of the paper develops the model and shows that in .the
absence of uncertainty, fully-funded Social Security plans will have--at best--
no real effects. The second section of the paper presents our theoretical
T, results concerning Social Security schemes. Some of the effects of Social
Security depend upon the form of the utility function and the distribution of
the exogenous output disturbance. The third section of the paper presents
simulation results for various distributions of the disturbances and par^eters
for the class of additive - constant relative risk aversion utility functions.
Conclusions and directions for further research are presented in the last
section of the paper.
I. The Model
In accord with the basic life cycle approach, we assume:
(i) Individuals live for only two periods; thus, an individual of gen-
eratioh t is born at the beginning of t and dies at the end of
period t+1.
(ii) The individual can work only in the first period of his life, but
consumes in both periods.
(iii) Individual utility - for a member of generation t - is given by:
=U(l-L|., c', where:
= work in t; (1-L^) = leisure
= consumption in j by a member of generation t; j=t, t+1. .
(iv) The economy is stationary; each generation consists of N identical
individuals; preferences of all individuals of all generations are
identical.
(v) Aggregate output is linear in total labor supply; output for each
period is subject to a random disturbance. This disturbance is
identical for members of the same generation. Further, the output
disturbance for different generations is identically, but indepen
dently, distributed.
(vi) A Social Security plan exists whereby an individual pays a constant
fraction of his earned income in taxes, and receives a transfer
during retirement. More will be said on this later.
(vii) Individuals choose their labor supply and consumption decisions to
maximize expected utility; furthermore, they have rational expecta
tions, i.e. their subjective probability distributions are identical
with the true probability distributions.
(viii) Money is the only store of value for individuals, as commodities are
•assumed perishable. Further, the money stock is constant (so that
Social Security benefits in t equal tax revenues in t).
(ix) Commodity prices - and their distribution - are determined by
aggregate equilibrium.
Mathematically, let:
(1) = the labor supply of individual i of generation t,
a N i
(2) L = S L ; aggregate labor supply at t.
i=l
(3) Qj. =A|.L^; E(A^) =1, cr^(A|.) >0.
In (3), E( ) denotes the expectation operator; below we let E( ) denote that
expectations run over x and y. Output in each period (t) is subject to a raoaom
productivity disturbance; and (i^O) assumed identically, but inde
pendently, distributed. For individual i of generation t, net income is:
(4) =Pj.Aj.L^(1-t) ,
where t is the tax rate, and the money price of commodities. Each individual
pays taxes in the first period of life, receiving transfers in the second; let:
(5) ~ transfer to i - of generation t - at (t+1) .
In general, the transfers to be received are random; assuming full-funding,
i.e., no money creation, so that transfers at t equal taxes at t:
(6) Rt = T-P,-A^L^,
where Is aggregate transfers at t to members of generation (t-1). Further, let:
a N •« »-
(7) - S V;
^ i=l ^
where is the first period consumption rule for members of generation t, and
is the aggregate consumption demand of the new generation.
At t, the old generation's aggregate buying power is (M + R^), where M
is the outstanding money stock^; thus, aggregate demand equilibrium is given by:
M+ Rf".(8) (J^)+C^ = ; or:
(9) (1-T) -
Given the aggregate labor supply, consumption demand and the realized
value of Aj., (9) determines the price level (Pj.); ex ante. It determines the
true distribution of prices (^^)* Further, since the economy is stationary,
the distributions of and ^.re identical, but independent.
Returning to individuals, they must choose (L^) » maximize expec
ted utility, given their subjective beliefs; consistent with rational expecta
tions, their beliefs about prices are governed by (9). Further, we assume
the maximization process for the individual consists of two steps:
(i) He must choose before A^, P^, and future prices and transfers
are known;
(ii) His consumption demand, is made after and A^. are known, but
before 3-nd (his net transfer next period) are known.
Given L^, his second period consumption is
(10)
Thus
3L i t
, given P , A , L , the individual chooses C to maximize:
Li U W ^
E [UCl-tJ, V,
^t+l'\+l
where the denotes is predetermined. This optimization procedure yields
the individual's consumption demand function, which depends on P^, A^,
and expectations of ^t+1* Finally, is determined by
(11) Max E ,[U(1-l';, V, V+S]
K'^'^t+l'Vl)
From (11), is determined; finally, a rational expectations solution
requires that individual beliefs reflect the actual distributions; and hence
that the aggregate consumption-labor supply decisions assumed in (9) are con
sistent with individual decisions.
In ganeral, it is not possible to determine analytic solutions for this
problem in general form, so we propose to present results for the special case
of additive, constant relative risk aversion utility functions. However, before
doing this, we shall specify the two types of Social Security plans we shall an-
"5^ alyze and discuss their impact in a world of certainty. The first plan - which
we call the proportional plan - ties the benefits the individual receives to his
work effort (and hence to his expected contributions):
^t+1 ^t+1
The second plan - what we call the fiat rebate plan or distortionary plan - gives
2
an equal amount to all retired individuals regardless of their prior work experience :
(11) R t+l = ^t+1 \+l
Note that -for either plan total benefits paid out in (t+1) equal tax receipts in
(t+1), as assumed earlier. Also, note that for either plan the real value, of, the
benefits an individual will receive are random, depending on the realization of
Under certainty clear from the stationarity of the- system
that P is constant over time (given a constant tax rate). Further, since all in
dividuals are alike -=L^=L^—N*L^. Clearly, the proportional tax plan has no
t+1 t
effect on individual consumption in either period or labor supply (under certainty),
as can be seen directly from (10) - the plan leaves relatiye prices, the real
return to labor, and the feasible consumption set unaltered. ' In essence, the
government is imposing forced savings on individuals (equal to tPL^); to offset
this, individuals simply reduce private savings (the demand for money) by a
couparable amount. Hence, the plan does not alter real variables, but does cause
domestic prices to increase. This, then, is a classic case of how individual
agents counteract the actions of government, as indicated by Barro and Samuelson.
On the other hand, the flat rebate scheme will affect the allocation of
resources, since it decreases the real return to labor; that is, if an indi
vidual agent chooses to work an extra hour, his net first period income
8increases by P(1-t), whereas his net benefits in the next period are unaltered.
Assuming both goods are net substitutes for leisure, and that leisure and both
good are normal, it can readily be shown that the net effect of plan (2) is
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to reduce labor supply and consumption in each period. Consequently, this
plan reduces utility for all generations and agents cannot successfully
circumvent it.
Thus, we see that in a world of certainty, there is no positive role to
be played by Social Security taxes within a model like ours. At best, a
proportional rebate plan (scheme 1) has no real effect but does increase
prices; a flat rebate plan (scheme 2) distorts decisions and leads to ineffi
ciency. We now turn, to analyze the impact of these plans under uncertainty
for additive, constant relative risk aversion utility functions.
II. Impact of Social Security Schemes for Specific Utility Functions
For tractability, we assume each agent's utility function is additive and
exhibits constant relative risk aversion:
(12) = (1/p) (1-L^)'' + (XI; pT^o.
For p = 0, (12) reduces to :
(12') uj =ln[l-L^] +ln[^C^] +\ InE'-C^"^^]; \ ^ 1
In the above equations, \(^1) represents the rate of time preference. Note
that p measures the degree of risk aversion (as well as the degree of substi-
tutability among commodities); specifically, (1-p) is the (absolute value of
the) degree of relative risk aversion.
A) The Logarithmic Case
We take this - the easiest case - first. Individual beliefs governing
prices are given by (9). Given L^, the individual chooses ^C^ to maximize:
(12") U= Ind-L^:) + In \ E ln[V*^^]; or:
{v. 'U
(13) T = \ E , where:
(14) = [P,(A^L^(1-t) - +4^,] /
In (13) - (14), Pj., A^, and are known, the distribution of is deter
mined by (9), and that of depends on the specific Social Security plan.
(13) determines the consumption demand, (P^.. . .) given expectations,
it iSubstituting into (12')and maximizing expected utility over - before
and A are known - yields:
(15)
(16)
T = \-E
1-L"t \'^t'^tH-l
In (15), we use the fact that:
i_t+l
^+1
•J
^ -1 >
Thus, (15) determines as dependent only on expectations; substituting into
yields consumption demand as a function of P^, A^ and expectations.
Since all agents are identical and the system is stationary,
SL SL d iL = L T = L = N-L ; further, if all agents behave optimally, then ex post
X U ii*
'actual rebates will be:
(17) R^+l =
Define:
(18) = ['c; / A^L^]; y^= [Nic^ / A^L^];
these are the individual and aggregate average propensities to consume out of
gross income. From (9):
a a(19) (M/Pj.) = A^L-^ (1-T-yp.
Substituting (14) - (18) In (13) yields:
(20) )
10
5L ir*"^ 3lSince all agents are identical, = y^. = y^, = L /N and:
(21) (^)=X-E
^t t+1 ^^t+1
Note that (21) must hold for all A^; hence y^ is independent of A^; further,
the functions y^ and must be identical. Therefore, the solutions to
(21) ;are:
(22) =(1-T) or y® = (-j^)
Before discussing! the cause of the multiple equilibrium, let us solve for
L^. For plan (1): a - i
(23) 5^ =^ ^+iVi =
L (1-T-y)
For plan (2):
3rJ:.i(24) =T A^^^ ^ =0.
Let Lj be individual labor supply under Social Security plan j; substitution
into (15) yields:
(25) = [X/(l-y+X)];
(26) L2 = X(l-T)/[l-y+\(l-T)];aL2/3T<0, y<l.
Finally, utility is determined from (12'), given:
(27) =A^^^(L^/N)(l-y).
Thus:
(28) ==ln [1-L^] + (1+X) In [L^] + ln(y) + \ In(l-y) + In A^. + XIn
Now that all the calculations are performed, some discussion is in order.
The first point to note is that there are two consumption rules that are con
sistent with rational expectations; this is a familiar case of self-
fulfilling expectations. Suppose that individuals at t believe all individu
als at (t+1) will do no private savings = (1-t)); in this case it is
clear their money balances will be worthless, and hence they have no incentive
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to save (yj.= (l-T)). This belief, then, that money has no value is a self-
fulfilling one; and note that, while it is consistent with rational expecta
tions, it is inefficient (unless t happens to be \/l+\)).
Let us concentrate, then, on the alternative solution 3^=[1/(1+X)], clearly,
the consumption rule is independent of Further, for plan (1), is also
independent of Tj hence, the proportional Social Security plan has no real ef
fect in this case (as in the case of certainty), its only effect being nominal -
to increase prices as t increases.
On the other hand, for the flat rebate plan (2), labor effort decreases
as T increases, so that -.despite rational expectations - the plan does affect
real variables. Further, as can readily be shown from (29), any Tt^O reduces
utility (realized or expected); hence, for this utility function, a flat rebate
plan can only lower utility - again analogous to the case, of certainty.
To sum up, for the given preferences, a proportional tax scheme has no real
effect, whereas a flat, one distorts the labor supply decision and lowers expected
utility. However, these results only hold for p=0, because in the logarithmic
case, private decisions are socially optimal. In part B of this section we
show that the socially optimal consumption rule is y =(1+X^^^ ^) ^ for all A^,
and the socially optimal labor supply is given by: L=[1+(1+X^^^ '^ ) (E(a'^ ))'^ ]
For the logarithmic case (p=0), these are the rules that private agents obey.
Thus, if Aj. is X% above (below) average, the working generation will increase
(decrease) its consumption by X%. The retired generation will find that their
savings yield X% more (less) consumption than on average. Thus, both genera
tions share equally in the deviation of output from average output, and there
is no room for policy to yield positive social benefits. When p?^0, private and
socially optimal consumption and labor supply rules differ. For these cases, a
Social Security plan--even the flat rebate plan that distorts labor incentives--
can raise individual expected utility.
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B) The General Case of Additive, Constant Relative Risk Aversion Preferences
Before proceeding with the equilibrium analysis, let us first inquire
into what an efficient allocation of resources would be. As always under un
certainty, the notion of efficiency must be defined; specifically, then, we
are looking for a stationary labor supply and consumption rule that will maxi
mize the expected utility of a representative individual. Preferences are
given by:
(29) = (l/pXd-L^)" + (^0')"+ p<1. 0.
As eariler, let:
(30) yt=(Ct/W'
in this context, y^ is the fraction of output at t that will be consumed by
the new generation; hence:
We seek a labor supply decision, L, and a consumption rule, y(A^), that maxi
mized expected utility:
(32) U=(l/p)r(l-l.)'' + E.(aP L''[y(Aj.)lP) +XE(aP_^^ LP[l-y(A|._|_^)]f)]
"^t+l
Since A and A , are identically distributed, (32) becomes:
t t+1
(33) U = (1/p) I(1-L)P + E[Ap(y(A)P +X(l-y(A))^^ ]
t - A ^
Note that we must choose y for each A, i.e., we seek the function y(A) that
maximizes (33). This, in essence, is an optimal control problem, and it is
clear that the solution is given by:
(34) y* = — for all A.
Optimizing (33) over L yields:
1 1
(35) L* = 1/[1 + (1 + (E(A^))P'^ ]
Note that for p=o, y* =("J^) » ® ' which is one of the rational
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expectation solutions for the logarithmic case. Thus, (34) and (35) yield an
efficient allocation pattern^, and private decisions are socially efficient
for the case p = 0.
Let us now consider the rational expectations equilibrium for p^. Given
Pj,, A^, L^, the individual chooses to maximize expected utility using (14):
(14-) = [P^(A^Li(l-T)>C^) + ,
we find:
(36) (^C^) P-^
defines .
Substituting in (29):
(37) lit = + E((^C^)P +X E^
^t+1 ^t+1
Optimizing over L yields:
®^t+i
(38) (l-L^)P'^ =X E t "\^i-t+r\ p-l"
t+1
Equations (36) and (38) determine L^, given expectations; assuming taxes
are a constant rate, expectations are consistent and all individuals are alike,
(36) can be rewritten as:
(39) (A^L^) (yj) =\ E
^t+X
^ ^t+1 p-n
t+1" " t+1
Using (9) - the price determination equation - and the identity of agents -
(39) reduces to:
(40). aP yP-^(l-T-yj^)= X- E [A^+iCl-T-yt+iXl-yt+l)"'^ ]
Vl
Since the LHS (left hand side) of (40) must hold for all A^, it follows that
y depends only on A and t; and is independent of L. :
(41) ^|o as p|0. .
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Thus, for p=0, this reduces to the same solution as the previous section.
For p^, two solutions exist;
(42) yj^(A)s(l-T), or
ay,(42') ^ 0,
Assuming y^CA) ^ (1-t), theoretically (40) can be solved for y(A), given the
distribution of A(the functions y^.(A^) and V^+l^^+l^ identical, given
identical preferences and identical distributions for A^, ^y+1^ * general,
this solution will depend on the distribution of A, and hence we cannot present
any precise analytical solution.
Given the solution, y(A), the individual labor supply decision for each
plan is determined from (38); after some simplification we find; for plan (1):
t
= (1-T) E
A.
AP(y(Ap)P'^ ] +\tE
which, given the distributions, could (theoretically) be solved for Lj^. For
^^t+1
plan (2), — « 0, and (38) reduces to:
t
(44) = (1-t) ErA®(y(A^))''"^j
2 Aj."
^ain, given the distribution of A, this could (theoretically) be solved for L^*
Thus, (40) and (43) or (44) determine individual - and hence aggregate -
behavior. From (40), as noted earlier, two solutions are possible. The first,
ys(l-T), is the self-fulfilling rational expectations solution that renders
money worthless Note that, for arbitrary t, this solution is inefficient, a
not uncommon characteristic of the self-fulfilling rational expectations solution,
For y < (1-t)> it can be shown that - given t - a unique solution (i.e..
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a unique function y(A) that solves (40)) exists ; note that for p ^ 0, this
solution will not be efficient in the sense defined earlier. Thus, it is
feasible for a Social Security plan to increase welfare.
Using the fact and identically distributed, (40) can be
rewritten as:
(40') XE[0^; =1. y<(l-T)
Hence:
For T > T*
and 1 « X E
A
1 / 1~ 0X '^P /(1+X )j , no solution to (40') exists; hence, for T> t ,
y « (1-t) Is the only solution. Furthermore, as t -* t from below, y -» (1-t );
1
*
at T :
1-p(46) y(T*) =1-T* 1/ (l+\^ yj,
-k
the effecient consumption rule found earlier. Further, at t , from (43),
using plan (1), labor is given by:
(47) L^(t*) =l/[(l+X^"P/^ (e(aP)^ +1_
Thus, for the proportional plan, the efficient allocation can be achieved by a
tax rate of (t ) ; in the absence of this plan, private decisions would be inef
ficient .^
In addition, one could readily demonstrate the impact of changes in the
tax rate on expected utility and labor supply. From (37):
(48) E[U^] = (1/p) [(l-L)P + E(A^-LP-yP) +XE (A^^^ (1-y) ") ]
\ *t+l
= (l/p)[(l-L)''+lP E (AP[yP + X(l-y)'']) .
A
16
In (48), we employ the assumption all generatiais behave identically and that
(A , 3.re identically distributed. Differentiating (48) with respect to
the tax rate t:
(49)^^^ =lP"^ [E(AP(yP+X(l-y)P^ - P-^]
+LP-E[AP(yP"^- \(l-y)P-^ j ,
For the proportional plan, the first expression in brackets on the RHS is
zero, as can be seen from (43). In addition, it can be demonstrated that the
second expression on the RHS is positive for T < t ; hence, expected utility
is monotonically increasing in t - up to the optimal tax rate - for this planJ
Also, from (43) we can determine how the labor supply is affected by the tax
rate:
(1-L )(50) (1-p) ^ =p.E AP(yP \(l-y)P ^)|^ J ^0as p^ 0, for t <T*
^1
Thus, increases in the tax rate can either raise or lower the labor supply de
pending on the degree of risk aversion. Note that there is no presumption
that the actual labor supply will be decreased as a result of the tax-transfer
plan.
Consider next the second tax scheme - the one in which the next period
transfer is independent of current effort. From (43) and (44) it is immedi
ately apparent that, for t > 0, less labor will be supplied under plan 2 than
plan 1: for t > 0. Intuitively, this is quite reasonable since this
second scheme lowers the (expected) return to labor, therefore causing indi
viduals to substitute leisure for consumption (and labor).
The impact of this tax plan on expected utility can be found from substi
tuting (44) into (49) and simplifying:
17
(51) =(L^) [xTE(AP(l-y) ] + (L^) PE[(APyP-^-X(l-y)
vhere, from (50)
(52) (l-o) ^ =-E[A®yP"^j - (l-T)(l-p) E[APyP'^ -f^_
Consider (51) first; since the second term on the RHS in (51) is positive, it
immediately follows that, for t®0, a small increase in the tax rate will increase
expected utility. Thus, for small tax rates, the benefits of intergenerational
risk-sharing dominate the costs imposed by the labor distortion introduced by
the plan.
However, as the tax rate increases, the net impact of further increases
in it on expected utility are ambiguous; on the one hand, it is beneficial
because of the risk-sharing, but on the other hand, the decrease in the labor
g
supply induced by higher taxes lowers expected utility. Consequently, for
^ "k
this second best plan, there will be an optimal tax rate t < t ; the magnitude
of this tax rate will, in general, depend upon p. As it is impossible to pro
vide an analytic solution for this "second-best" tax rate, in the next section
we shall provide some simulation experiments that estimate its value.
To sum up the results of this section, we have found for the proportional
tax plan that:
(i) there exists an optimal tax rate that supports the efficient allocation;
(ii) individual expected utility is increasing in the tax rate, for tax
rates less than the optimal rate;
(iii) the effect on labor supply depends on the degree of risk aversion;
higher tax rates - under this plan - can either raise or lower actual labor
supply. In contrast, for the flat tax plan, in which transfers are independent
of that individual's labor supply, we have seen that:
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(iv) labor supply is always lower under this plan than under the propor
tional plan (t>0);
(v) due to substitution effects - the net intact of the tax is to lower
labor supply; '
(vi) the effect of increases in the tax rate on expected utility is am
biguous, due to offsetting effects of labor distortions and risk-sharing. How
ever, for T near zero, increases in t increase expected utility, whereas for
T near t they decrease it. Consequently, a positive optimal tax rate exists
for this plan. In the next section we provide simulation results that calcu
late this optimal tax rate, and show how its value depends on p and the variance
of A.
III. Simulation Results
In the previous section, it was shown that for the proportional tax plan,
increases in the tax rate, up to the optimal rate, increase (decrease) the
supply of labor if p is positive (negative). Further, the optimal tax rate is
given by:
(53) T* . p 0.
However, for the flat rebate plan it was not possible to obtain analytic
solutions for the second best tax rate or to demonstrate whether labor supply
and expected utility are monotonic for a less-than-optimum tax rate. In this
9
section we simulate the model in order to provide the magnitudes of changes
under the proportional plan and to find the optimum tax rate in the distortionary
scheme. Furthermore, we also discuss the extent to which Social Security
taxation alters private saving.
A) Consumption and Labor Supply Effects
We simulate the model using the general form of the utility function
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given by equation (12) for several different assumptions concerning the dis
tribution of the output disturbance (A^ . In all cases it is assumed that the
output disturbance is independently distributed with.mean equal to unity. Our
first set of simulations assumes that the output disturbance is drawn from a
S3?mmetric binomial distribution. For the three cases we considered, the output
disturbance could have realized values of .8 or 1.2 so that Var(A) —.04j
.5 or 1.5 so that Var(A) = .25; or .2 or 1.8 so that Var (A) = .64. For
this set of simulations, tax rates between 0.0 and .5 were considered at in
tervals no greater than .01. We examined all p in the range 0.9 to -.9 at
intervals of .1 for values of \ = 1.0 and 0.8. Fortunately, the endogenous
variables in the system (including expected utility) are monotonic in p, X,
and Var (A) so that only selected results need be presented. Another set of
simulations considered the case in which the output disturbance was drawn
from a log-^normal distribution. As the qualitative results appear to be
robust to the form of the distribution, we present a single example of the
case in which the output disturbance is log-normally distributed.
Table 1 presents the optimal tax rates for alternative values of p and
the rate of time preference. Notice that the'optimal tax rates for the pro
portional plan are distribution-free and are monotonic in rho if \ < 1.0.
Also, note that--as demonstrated by equation (50)--there is a positive tax
rate that maximizes expected utility for the distortionary Social Security scheme,
In Table 1 the optimal tax rates for plan 2 are such that each satisfies the
maximization problem in equations (51) and (52). Further, as discussed above,
•k • , .
the optimal tax rate t is always greater than the tax rate that maximizes
expected utility under the distortionary scheme (t)• Probably the most important
demonstration in Table 1 is that the "second-best" optimal tax rate is an
increasing function of the variance of the output disturbance. This is easily
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understood, once it is remembered that a Social Security plan is a means by
which intergenerational risk sharing can be increased. The greater the risk
(i.e., the greater Var (A)) the greater are the marginal benefits to be
derived from risk sharing. Thus, the Barro-Samuelson contention concerning
the irrelevance of fully-funded Social Security programs cannot be extended
to an uncertain economic environment: even distortionary programs can increase
social welfare. While the second best tax rate in the flat rebate plan is not
monotonic in rho or the discount rate, a high degree of relative risk aversion
is associated with a relatively large "optimal" Social Security tax rate
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the effects of Social Security taxes on the supply
of labor and on the average propensity to consume. Space considerations prohibit
consideration of all values of p and the tax rate, but the results presented
are quite representative of all our results. Before we examine specific cases,
some general remarks are in order. For the proportional tax scheme, the mag
nitude of.the change in the supply of labor is quite small. Yet, as indicated
in Section II:
1) The supply of labor under the proportional tax scheme is always greater
than that of the distortionary scheme for corresponding tax rates not
equal to zero.
2) Under the flat rebate plan, increases'in the tax rate strongly discourage
work. For the proportional plan, increasing the tax rate may act to
increase or decrease the supply of labor depending upon the degree of
relative risk aversion and whether t — T . The supply of labor is.maxi-'
mized (minimized) at a tax rate of t if p is positive (negative).
"k
3) Under the proportional plan, the socially optimal labor supply (L ) and
•k it
average propensity to consume (y ) occur at t . For the flat rebate plan,
in some cases it is possible to obtain either the socially optimal labor
RHO
.8
-.8
-.8
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TABLE 2
SUPPLY OF LABOR
PROPORTIONAL PLAN FLAT REBATE TAX
•k
•ir
TAX No time preference (X=1.0)
VAR (A)=.64VAR (A)=.04 VAR CA)=.64 VAR (A)=.04
0,0 .66145 .55252 .66145 .55252
.1 .66196 .56557 .53547 .41626
.2 .66240 .57772 .39014 .27274
.3 .66275 .58522 .24728 .14905
.4 .66298 .59055 .13223 .09401
= .5 .66306 .59241 .06358 .04775
0.0 .665749 .64427 .665749 .64427
.1 .665752 .64434 .635812 .61295
.2 665754 64442 .601723 .57700
.3 .665757 . .64450 .560450 .53558
.4 .665759 .64457 .512582 . .48777
= .5 .665760 .64460 .461922 .43873
0.0 .670578 .75628 .670578 .75628
.1 .670533 .75588 .657320 .74252
.2 .670480 .75533 .642205 .72618
.3 .670413 .75454 • .624758 .70677
.4 .670339 .75337 .604362 .68585
.670289 .75245 .583076 .67649
Positive time preference (X= .8)
0.0 .56568 .47409 .56568 .47409
.1 . .56614 .48507 .43473 .34759
. .2 .56639 .49046 .29946 .23510
^ .25 .56642 49105 .23667 .18695
.3 .56638 49031 .18035 .14422
0.0 65719 .74514 ,65719 .74514
.1 .65713 .74466 .64365 .73069
.2 .65707 .74398 .62826 .71355
.3 .65699 .74299 .61055 .69352
. .4 .65691 .74165 .58998 .67424
^ .47 .656882 .74110 .57365 .66816
.48 .656883 .74112 .57119 .66802
RHO
.5
-.5
.5
39<t*<.4
-.5
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TABLE 3
AVERAGE PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME
TAX
0.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
•k
T =
0.0
.1
.2
.3
*
T = .5
0.0
.1
.2
.3
.39
.4
No time preference (X=I.Qy
*
.46<t <.47
0.0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.46
.47
VAR (A)«.04 VAR (A).= .64
II
CO
A^=1.2 At=-2 A^=1.8
.4651 .5326 .2920 .6583
.4702 .5281 .3233 .6314
.4761 .5228 .3604 .6095
.4828 .5166 .4032 .5812
.4907 .5091 .4504 .5451
.5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
.5190 .4785 .5748 3621
.5174 .4806 .5710 .3749
.5152 .4832 .5651 .3923
.5122 .4868 .5552 .4171
.5076 .4920 .5367 4529
.5000 .5000 .5000 .5000
Positive time preference
s
II
o
CO
.5784 .6383 .4088 .7357
.5851 .6326 .4564 .7149
.5927 .6260 .5088 .6872
.6011 .6182 .5629 .6508
.60973 .60978 .6096 .6098
.6107 .6088 .6146 .6048
.5562 .5154 .6113 .3948
.5543 .5178 .6069 .4106
.5517 .5210 .5998 .4324
.5480 .5253 .5873 .4633
.5424 .5316 .5632 .5059
.5374 .5368 .5385 .5356
.5367 .5378 .5335 .5406
Note: The average propensities to consume are invariant
to the tax scheme. Thus, the figures above are
the average propensity to consume under either
plan.
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supply or average propensity to consume (but not both).
4) It is of interest to note that under either tax scheme, the smaller is
rho, the greater is the supply of labor. Thus, the. results do not bear
out the claim that risk aversion would induce individuals to substitute
the certainty of leisure for the uncertainty of market activities. Rather
as risk aversion increases, individuals are drawn into work activities in
10
order to provide for consumption in retirement.
Notice that the direction of change of the labor supply and average
propensity to consume depend upon the sign of p. Consider first the case in
which rho is positive. Clearly--as indicated by equation (41)—9y/SA^ is
positive. For the case of a binomial distribution, the effects of an increase
* if *
in the tax rate is to increase y for yc^ and to decrease y for y>y . At t >
* •Itthe two values of y are equal. Thus, for t<t , low-output generations will
consume a smaller proportion of their output than is socially optimal and high-
output generations will consume a larger proportion than is socially optimal.
To see why this is important, consider the special case in which \=1 so that
y =.5. When the actual value of y is .5, a generation that has an output,
say 50%, lower (higher) than average will reduce (increase) its consumption
by 507o. The retired generation will find that real cash balances purchase
50% fewer (more) goods than average. Thus, both generations share equally in
the output uncertainty. In the case under consideration, however, low-output
generations will reduce their consumption by a relatively small amount (as y<.5)
and high-;output generations will increase their consumption by a relatively
large amount (as y>.5). As such, there tends to be less intergenerational
T
ie
risk sharing. Increases in the tax rate, for t<t act to spread the uncertainty
across generations. In doing so, as can be seen from Table 2, individuals will
be drawn into work activities under the proportional tax scheme. With the flat
rebate plan, the distortionary effects are to reduce the supply of labor.
25
Thus, the flat rebate plan reduces consumption uncertainty at the expense of
distorting the labor supply decision.
Again considering positive values for p, the larger is the variance of
the output disturbance, the smaller is the supply of labor. High-output
variance also acts to decrease the average propensity to consume of low-
output generations and increase the average propensity to consume of high-
output generations. Thus, output uncertainty acts to move the economy away
from the optimal consumption and labor supply rules.
Considering the case in which people are very risk averse (p<0), high
tax rates -act to decrease the supply of labor and to decrease (increase) the
average propensity to consume of low (high) output generations. High output
variance acts to increase the supply of labor and to move the average propen-
sity to consume away from y . In this case, the supply of labor will be less
than L for all t < t ; and y > y for low-output generations, but y < y for
high-output generations.
Combined with Section XI, the simulation results indicate that Social
Security can pool risks intergenerationally. For risk averse individuals,
then, social welfare can be increased by resorting to an intergenerational
transfer of commodities via Social Security taxation. These results appear
to be quite robust to the distribution of the output disturbances. In Table
4, we present the effects of the two Social Security plans on labor supply
and expected utility when disturbances are log-normally distributed. The
direction of change in expected utility and work effort are in complete accord
with the results for the binomial distribution. When rho is positive (and
\ = 1), an increase in the tax rate acts to increase labor supply under the
proportional plan and reduce it with a flat rebate. Expected utility is
largest under the proportional plan with a tax rate of .5. Note
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that under the flat rebate scheme, there is a positive second-best tax rate.
B) Saving Effects
We now consider the effects of Social Security taxation on saving deci
sions. While money is the only asset in the model, and the nominal money supply
is fixed because we only consider fully funded Social Security programs, the
private sector can alter saving via changes in the price level. Recall from
equation (9) that the real value of cash balances is given by:
(9) ^ =AtLj(l-T)-C^.
As real cash balances can be considered to be total private saving (net of
Social Security), equation (9) indicates that actual or realized saving will
be dependent upon the realization of A^. Thus, it is meaningful to consider re
alized private savings (M/P or R|S) and expected private savings (E[M/P ] or EPS).
Additionally, it is possible to consider the amount that the retired genera
tion consumes (M/P^. + the rebate) and the amount the retired generation can
be expected to consume (i.e., expected private saving plus the expected re
bate), or expected total saving (ETS). Thus, expected total saving is given
by: .
(54) ETS = E[M/P^ + tAj.L^] = E[Aj.L^ - C^].
Table 5 indicates the extent to which the various concepts of saving are •
affected by the tax scheme, tax rate, rho and the discount rate (X). All
simulations are for the case in whicn A^ is drawn from a bionomial distri
bution. The results presented in the table are representative of all rho
between .9 and -.9. Clearly, for all cases, high output realizations lead to
high realized private saving, and Social Security taxation does not lead to
a dollar-for^dollar reduction in private saving. Rather, the flat rebate plan
always acts to reduce both expected private saving and expected total s.aving.
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In the case o£ the proportional plan, Social Security taxation acts to reduce
expected private saving, but may act to increase or decrease expected total
saving. Thus, if rho is negative, there is --in an expected sense--more than
a dollar-for-dollar reduction in private saving for either scheme. If rho is
positive, less than a dollar-for-dollar reduction occurs for the proportional plan.
The effects of output variations on saving are not always monptonic.
However, under either tax plan, if rho is positive, increasing the variance of
the output disturbance acts to reduce both EPS and ETS for all tax rates less
•k
than T . When rho is negative, both EPS and ETS increase as the variance of
output increases. These results indicate that if individuals are strongly risk
averse (p<0) they react to high output and price variability by saving for re
tirement. If individuals are less risk averse (p>0) they react to high output
and price variability by consuming; thereby reducing the possibility of large
capital gains or losses on their savings when retired. Lastly, it is possible
to consider the effects of Social Security taxes on the realized consumption
of the retired generation. While not shown directly in the tables, realized
or actual consumption of the retired generation is negatively (positively)
related to the tax rate in the proportional plan if p(A^-E[Aj) is negative
(positive).
IV. Conclusions
We have shown that in an uncertain world, fully funded Social Security
programs can increase social welfare and affect individual labor supply, con
sumption and .saving decisions. This result was derived from a model in which
individuals maximize expected utility and have rational expectations. Thus,
there are economic reasons—as opposed to irrationality or myopia—which can
be used to justify fully funded Social Security programs. Social Security can
be used as a means to spread exogenous output and endogenous price uncertainty
across generations.
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The major limitation of our model is that we assume money is the only
store of value. Allowing for storable commodities would certainly change many
of our results. However, few commodities can be stored risk-free so that
there are few ways to risklessly transfer consumption' intertemporally. We also
believe that it would be useful to consider Social Security programs in the
context of a model that does allow for some--albeit risky--commodity storage.
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FOOTNOTES
♦ T*
The authors are Associate Professor and Professor of Economics at Iowa
State University. We would like to thank Roy Gardner for his suggestions.
^ We assume no bequest motive exists, so the new generation starts with
no money; the money holdings of a member of the older generation equal the
difference between that individual's net income and consumption expenditures
from the previous period.
^ Of course, since all individuals are alike, ex post the transfer to
all individuals of the same generation will be identical. However, the two
plans lead to different labor supply decisions since the individual, in
choosing his labor-supply decision, (correctly) assumes his choice does not
affect other agents. In other words, if individual 1 were to choose a sub-
optimal labor decision, this would not induce others to do likewise. Con
sequently, under plan 1, an individual pays tax on each extra hour worked,
but also receives an increase in expected benefits, whereas under plan 2 there
is ho offsetting increase in benefits due to an increase in L^.
Also, the general price level will tend to increase as the tax rate
increases, since the demand for money will decrease. In particular, for tax
rates less than 50%, prices must increase as t increases.
^ It should also be noted that this solution maximizes the expected
value of a Bergsonian Social Welfare function that is additive in individual
utilities.
^ Details are omitted to conserve space; a proof is available from the
authors upon request.
^ If a private insurance system could be established whereby individuals
pledged ex ante to contribute t* of the income in their work period in return
for a comparable remuneration next period, then this plan would - of course -
achieve an efficient allocation without government intervention. The problems
that seem to arise for this scheme are; (i) how does the insurance company
enforce its contract; people with an unusually good outcome for At may try to
opt out (cancel) their plan. Hence, contracts must be made ex ante and must
be enforceable; (ii) how does an individual know any one company will be sol
vent next period?; if 30% of the population engages in an insurance contract
with company B, and only 25% join next year, the company cannot fulfill its
contract. Hence, either there must be only one company, or agents must have
perfect foresight (not just rational expectations) as to what insurance en
rollments will be next period. While a private insurance plan might work in
such an environment, it seems that it is logically equivalent to a government
plan, and the government programs seem to reduce the uncertainty concerning
enforcement of contracts and membership enrollments.
^ The proof that E[A^(yP ^-\(l.-y)^ t < t ,
ot
is rather tedious; since this demonstration would add little insight, it is
omitted in order to conserve space. Interested readers may obtain a proof from
the authors.
g
For p > 0, labor effort monotonically decreases as the tax rate .
increases; for p < 0, we have not been able to show that labor effort mono
tonically declines with higher taxes. However, since labor effort under this
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plan is less than that for the proportional plan, and since - for p < 0 - tax
increases decrease labor supply under the proportional plan, the net impact
of taxes under the flat rebate scheme is to reduce labor effort.
^ The term "simulation" has come to have several different meanings, so
that some explanation is in order. In order to solve for the endogenous
variables in the model, it is necessary to specify values for rho, the irate
of time preference, and the theoretical distribution of the output distur
bance. Note that it is not necessary to specify a time path for actual
realizations of the output disturbance: at the risk of being redundant, only
the theoretical distribution need be specified.
Note that for our utility function, p determines both the degree of
risk aversion and the elasticity of substitution among "goods" Hence, our
conclusions concerning how changes iti p affect behavior reflect the impact of
changes in, both the degree of risk aversion and the degree of commodity sub-
stitutability.
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SUPPLEMENT TO "SOCIAL SECURITY TAXATION AND
INTERGENERATIONAL RISK SHARING"
BROOF OF MONOTONICITY OF EXPECTED UTILITY IN TAX RATE
Let U = maximized expected utility. From 49 for positive L, sgn [BU/^t] is
given by:
(1) ^ R fAPrvP-i.' p-1. , where y - (A) . From (40):
T ST
(2) APyP'^ (l-T-y)= H(t) = \ e rAP(l-T-y)(l-y)''"^ ; from (40')
(3) E
(4) E
- yP
= 0; therefore, y changes signs.
: T
From (2), since the LHS holds for all A:
(5) ^ = yf6(l-T-y) - 1] .
(1-d)(1-t) + DV 'p py
Thus, from (5), there exists:
(6) y s.t. y^ - 0 as y - y ; y ^ ^9(1-t)-1 > 0.
Define:
(7) y s.t. \ P-i-
y
= 1; [V (hx^-p )]
Rewrite (1):
From (4), for any 0, 0 E
r/ y
(8) = H-E
OT
^^y^J ^ insert in (1'):
[G4?;7) e-f) ""0 -»e-?)c-gf) a
• - [G-:^)Of)©t[e?)«c-gf))
Define:
(9) M(y) = y[(??)•C-Sf)
Choose (S s;t. M(y'^ ) =0 (where y^(y*) =0). Then:
(10) (i I 0as y* I y.
Note that
(11) lim M(y) ^ 0 as 0 ^ 0 for p> 0
y-0
lim M(y) > 0 for p < 0
y-0
(12) , M (1-t) < 0 for T < T .
Also:
(13)
dM
dy ^ y
d^
=Cf") - (i-p) y'"' [p-yl - x-
(i-y)
(14)
dy'
=-(l-p)p.[(l-y)'P.yP'^ +yP'^ (l-y)" '^'" '^-^] - 2(^t
(1-y)
(iT
(i-y)
Consider p<0. If 0>0, (^^^/dy^ <0everywhere, and hence there is a unique
y(=y ) s.t. M(y ) = 0. If 0 < 0, > 0; since M(0) > 0, M(y ) - 0, M(1-t) < 0,
dy
there can only be one root for M(y) on the interval [0,(1-t)]. Therefore, for
p < 0:
M(y) ^ 0 as y —y . Returning to (8) :
(8-) |^ =H.E ief)s i > 0 since M(y)y ^ 0,J T
*
with strict inequality for y f y .
* d^M
For p > 0, 0 > 0, M(0) > 0, M(y ) = 0, M(1-t) < 0, and —r < 0; again,
dy
this implies M(y) has only one root on [0,(1-t)]; therefore, M(y)-y^ s 0, and
M(y)y^> 0, y 7^ y . Thus, by (8'), |^> 0.
For p > 0, 0 < 0 another approach is needed. Remember:
(15) 0<O-»y <y-+ 0(I-T-y) < 1, from (6) .
Differentiating (2) with respect to T and simplifying:
(16) pE[AP(yP-^-ui-y) P-^) yJ =h-e[(^) (x 0^) P-l-l) (l +^ (1-p) (1-T))^
Using (3), for any a:.
(17) p.e[aP (yP-^-Xd-y) yj =
(l-l^(l-p)(l-T)-a(l-T-y)) _
Define:
(18) K(y,0!) =1+^ (1-p)(1-t) - a (1-T-y)
Choose a s.t. K(y) = 0, using (5):
nq-) Z = py + C1-o)(1-t)9(1-t-v)
^ ^ ^ (l-T-y)((l-p)(l-T) + py)
(20) K(y) =
(^(l-p)(l-T) + py^
py+e(l-p) (1-t) (l-T-y)-a(l-T-y)(^(l-p) (l-T)+py^
•k
- ^ K (V)
(^(1-p) (l-T)+py^
(21) K*(0) = (e-cy)(i-p)(i-x)^
K*(y) = 0
K*(1-t) = p(l-T)
d\*(22) r- = 2ap
dy
Note that:
(23) e - Of = Qvre(i-T-v^-ii
((l-p)(l-T)+py) (1-T-y)
*
< 0, p > 0, y > y
Consequently, for p> 0., y > y*, K*(0) < 0 = K*(y) < (1-t), and > 0
dy
implies there is only one root to K (y) on [0,(1-t)]. Returning to (17):
2 *
(24) p-e[aP (yP"^-\(l-y)P-^)yJ =
b" QfO I ° yf y;•; K(y) ^0 as y^ y. So, the product
K(y) P"^-l s 0, with strict equality for y ^ y
Hence, ^>0 for t < T* for all cases. Q.E.D.
OT
SECOND SUPPLEMENT: Taxes and Labor Supply
For the proportional tax scheme, we have seen that the Impact of tax
Increases on labor supply depends only on p:
(1) ^|o as p|o.
For the flat rebate tax scheme, from (44);
,1-L
(2) APyP" '^ , using (2) of
^pendlx I. Thus,
(3) (1-p)
(l-Lp 3L2 p(0a-T)+D(l-T-y)-(l+y
= -H(t)E
' 3t
(1-T-y)
J
where 0 Is as defined In (5) of Appendix I.
Substituting for y :
T
(1-L„)P"^ 3L,
(4) (1-p) f- ^ -H(t)E
(L2)P
(1-d)(1-t)9(1-t-v)+ov
-(l-T-y)Qi-p)(i-T)+py}^
< 0, p > 0.
5L.
Thus, r— < 0 for p > 0; for p < 0 it does not seem possible to demonstrate
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monotonlclty of (see our simulation results). However, for t = 0, from
(52) of the text:
(l-L )P"^ 3L,
(5) • (1-p) ^ ^ = -E
r y.
= -E
At T=0
(6) Er ^Ly(l-T-y)- — £ Ly(l-y)
APyP-^ j - (1-t)(1-p)E
_APyP"^j - (1-t)(1-p)H(t)-E
aPA^y^ J
Ly(l-T-y)J
But
> > * y ^ D-1^ 0 as y —y ; and is decreasing in y; thus:
(7) E
L.y(l-T-y) J
= E
T yP
hi.
p-
it
y 11=21
-T yP
p-_2.,
= 0
Consequently, from (5), ^ t - 0.
While we cannot show L2 decreases monotonically in t, we have shown
L^(t), t > 0 being labor supply for the proportional plan), and
- ^ Oj p < 0. Thus, the net impact of any tax is to decrease L2; i.e.,
L2 '^'') ^ T > 0.
